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THE UNCOMFORTABLE SOFA:  
ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA 




This article will analyze the anti-American sentiments in South Korea in the context of  the US-
South Korea Status of  Forces Agreement (SOFA).  First, it will compare the Articles concerning 
criminal jurisdiction in the US-South Korea SOFA with the US-NATO SOFA which, is arguably the 
most reciprocal and fair SOFA signed by the US.1  Analysis will show that the crux of  the problem is 
not in the text of  the US-South Korea SOFA, but in the habitual procedures of  dealing with concur-
rent criminal jurisdictions.2  Next, it will compare the Articles concerning the terms and conditions 
of  returning the military bases to the host nations in the two SOFAs.3  Unlike the US-NATO SOFA, 
the US-South Korea SOFA essentially exempts the US from environmental accountability and 
burdens South Korea to bear the full costs of  cleaning up the returned facilities.4  This article will 
recommend revising procedural habits to promote the legitimacy and the consistency of  concurrent 
criminal jurisdiction procedures.5  It will also recommend textual revision of  provisions concern-
ing the return of  military bases to promote a more equitable solution involving cost-sharing by the 
two countries.6  By implementing these recommendations, the US-South Korea SOFA will be more 
transparent and evenhanded, thereby alleviating the concerns of  inequality and injustice among the 
South Korean public.7  Doing so will reduce sources of  anti-American sentiment arising out of  the 
US-South Korea SOFA and in turn, will strengthen the support for the alliance between the two 
*      Jimmy Koo is a JD/MA candidate at American University - Washington College of  Law and School of  
International Service.  He received his BA in International Relations and East Asian Studies at the University of  
Wisconsin-Madison.  
1  See infra sec. III A.
2  See infra sec. III A.
3  See infra sec. III B.
4  See infra sec. III B.
5  See infra sec. IV.
6  See infra sec. IV.
7  See infra sec. IV.
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countries.8  In light of  the threat posed by the nuclear brinkmanship of  North Korea and the in-
creasing economic and political importance of  South Korea, maintaining a robust alliance is crucial 
for the US’s interests.  This article will conclude that the fi rst step towards maintaining a healthy 
relationship is to lessen the rising frequency of  anti-American sentiment by addressing the concerns 
arising from the US-South Korea SOFA.
II. BACKGROUND.
A. The dynamics of  the US-South Korea alliance since the Korean War 
and the rise of  anti-American sentiment in South Korea.
The end of  the Korean War in 1953 marked the beginning of  the modern day alliance between 
South Korea and the US.9  In 1954, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) was stationed through-
out the peninsula, allowing the US to maintain its geopolitical infl uence in East Asia.10  By the 1990’s 
South Korea had achieved tremendous socioeconomic growth and the end of  the Cold War had 
fundamentally altered the dynamics of  the alliance.11  Today, around 29,000 USFK troops are still 
stationed in South Korea.12  Over the years, clashes between the USFK and local South Koreans 
have caused emotional controversies and occasionally resulted in public expressions of  anti-Amer-
ican sentiment in what is otherwise a long and successful alliance.13  According to Sung-Han Kim, 
there are three kinds of  anti-Americanism in South Korea: ideological, issue-specifi c, and popular.14  
The majority of  anti-American sentiment in South Korea is issue specifi c and arises from the crimes 
against South Koreans perpetrated by the USFK and the terms and conditions of  returning the mili-
tary facilities back to South Korea.15  
In the summer of  2000, 14,000 South Korean protesters clashed with the police in Seoul while 
8  See infra sec. IV.
9  See Ting Xu, US-ROK Alliance:  Looking Toward the Future, SAIS US-SOUTH KOREA Y.B. 2007, at 19, available at http://
uskoreainstitute.org/pdf/ YB07/SAIS_Yearbook_Rev072007.pdf.
10  See id. at 20 (insisting that the Mutual Defense Treaty improved military quality of  South Korea, allowed South 
Korea to develop economically, and helped the US counteract communism in the region). 
11  See id. (highlighting the common view among South Koreans by the end of  the Cold War that they should have 
more control over their own security, while many Americans started to consider South Korea as ungrateful free riders).
12  E.g., Sung-ki Jung, US to Keep 28,500 Troops in Korea, THE KOREA TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, available at https://www.
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/05/205_22820.html.
13  Scott Snyder, Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the US-South Korea Alliance, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD,, 
April 2009, at 1, available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090409_snyder_ pursuingcompvision_web.pdf. 
14  Sung-Han Kim, Brothers Versus Friends: Inter-Korean Reconciliation and Emerging Anti-Americanism in South Korea, in 
KOREAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES: CHANGING DYNAMICS, 195 (David I. Steinberg ed., M.E. Sharpe 2005).
15  See Bruce Cummings, The Structural Basis of  Anti-Americanism, in KOREAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES:  
CHANGING DYNAMICS, at 99 (David I. Steinberg ed., M.E. Sharpe 2005) (referring to the demonstrations, many of  which 
included people of  all ages marching together to urge reform of  the US-South Korea SOFA, and to move military bases 
out of  Seoul).
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expressing their discontent over the actions of  American soldiers stationed in South Korea.16  In 
2002, thousands of  South Korean protesters demanded the US to hand over the soldiers who ac-
cidentally killed two South Korean schoolgirls while driving an armored car en route to a training ex-
ercise.17  The US ultimately declined to surrender jurisdiction and the two responsible soldiers were 
subsequently acquitted for negligent homicide under a US military court.18  An underlying frustra-
tion towards a seeming pattern of  unfairness and injustices sparked the protests. The South Korean 
public reacted explosively by targeting soldiers and foreigners to open aggression, intimidation and 
discrimination.19   
In the 2006 Korean movie The Host, a monster that mutated as a result of  pollution by the 
USFK causes havoc in Seoul.20  The summer blockbuster satirically reminded the South Korean 
public of  the controversy in 2000, involving illegal discharge of  toxic chemicals into the Han River 
by a USFK personnel and the subsequent refusal by the USFK to prosecute the wrongdoer.21  This 
highly controversial incident initiated greater awareness of  environmental pollution caused by the 
USFK.22  Environmental concerns have recently resurfaced in the Korean media due to the discov-
ery of  severe pollution at bases which the US is scheduled to return to Korea in 2010.23  The con-
troversy mainly involves the burden on the South Korean government to bear all of  the costs of  the 
clean up ranging from hundreds of  millions to billions of  dollars.24  
B. History of  military base agreements and the use of  Status of  Forces Agreements.
16  See Thousands in S. Korea Protest US, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2000, available at http://Articles.latimes.com/2000/jul/26/
news/mn-59376 (“Armed with rocks and bamboo staffs, students and farmers attacked club-wielding police and wrote 
protest messages in blood….”). 
17  See Don Kirk, Koreans Protest US Military’s Handling of  a Fatal Accident, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at A14, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/04/world/koreans-protest-us-military-s-handling-of-a-fatal-accident.html.
18  See Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Criminal Jurisdiction Under the US-South Korea Status of  Forces Agreement: Problems to Proposals, 
13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. POL’Y 213, 215–16 (2003) (observing that the US reluctantly charged the soldiers with negligent 
homicide but refused to surrender primary jurisdiction and were eventually tried in an all-US-citizen jury trial).
19  See Brian Deutsch, 2002 Tank Incident and Aftermath, THE KOREA TIMES, June 19, 2008, available at http://www.
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/05/198_26181.html (tracing the root cause of  the massive protests against 
the US in the summer of  2002).  
20  See Gwoemul (2006), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0468492/ (the events at the beginning of  the movie were based 
on actual events when a US military civilian was directed to dispose of  “formaldehyde” by discarding it into the Han 
River at the objection of  a South Korean assistant). 
21  See The Eighth US Army Division Discharged Toxic Fluid (Formaldehyde) into the Han-River, GREEN KOREA UNITED, Sept. 
1, 2002, available at http://green-korea.tistory.com/74 (demanding punishment of   USFK personnel who issued the 
order to dump twenty boxes of  formaldehyde and methanol into the Han River without detoxifi cation).
22  See Environmental Problem Related to Military Activities, GREEN KOREA UNITED, Jan. 16, 2008, available at http://green-
korea.tistory.com/44 (observing that since the formaldehyde dumping incident, the increased intensity of  investigation 
has revealed 8.8 cases of  pollution incidents per year after 2000, which is more than twice as much as in the 1990’s). 
23  Severe Pollution Levels Detected at 13 US Bases Scheduled For Return to S. Korea, THE HANKYOREH, Mar. 18, 2009, available 
at http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/ e_national/344760.html (listing the level of  pollution in the military 
bases, some of  which, exceeded the South Korean standard by more than 150 times over the legal limit).
24  See id. 
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Before the end of  World War II, the US maintained complete jurisdiction in military bases 
abroad, based on the principle of  the Law of  the Flag.25  However, the competing principle of  Terri-
torial Sovereignty argues that the host state should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all occurrences 
within its territories.26  Today, Territorial Sovereignty remains as the default jurisdictional principle 
unless states formulate special agreements such as the SOFA.27  The US and South Korea signed its 
SOFA in 1966, under Article IV of  the Mutual Defense Treaty.28  Considering the comparative levels 
of  socioeconomic and political maturity between the US and South Korea in 1966, critics argue that-
South Korea did not have much input in negotiating the terms of  the agreement and that the texts 
of  the SOFA are unfairly favorable to the US.29  
III. ANALYSIS
A.  Criminal jurisdiction provisions of  the US-South Korea SOFA 
and the US-NATO SOFA are essentially identical.
The US-NATO SOFA has become the template after which other SOFAs are modeled after, and 
many states view it as the ideal SOFA agreement.30  Critics argue that the inherent unfairness of  the 
US-South Korea SOFA criminal jurisdiction provision is derived from the textual unfairness and it 
should be revised to mirror the criminal jurisdiction provision in the US-NATO SOFA.31  However, 
a comparison of  the criminal jurisdiction provision of  the two SOFAs reveals the weaknesses in the 
25  E.g., Ryan M. Scoville, A Sociological Approach to the Negotiation of  Military Base Agreements, 14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2006) (stating that the US Supreme Court’s holding in Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 US 116 (1812) 
justifi ed Law of  the Flag since it was tactically important for the visiting military to maintain exclusive control over the 
forces). 
26  See Jeffrey L. Dunoff  et al., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS:  A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 360 
(2d ed. 2006) (noting that during the 19th century, most of  the states assumed that territorial jurisdiction limited their 
own ability to regulate conduct outside of  their territory).
27  See Jennifer Gannon, Renegotiation of  the Status of  Forces Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of  Korea, 
2000 COLO. J. INT’L EVNTL. L. & POL’Y 263, 265 (2000) (reasoning that SOFAs represent a balancing of  host nation’s 
sovereignty and the US’s interest in governing its troops abroad, whereas before SOFAs the US enjoyed a “much broader 
immunity” by the nations who hosted US military installations).
28  Agreement under Article IV of  the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of  America and the Republic 
of  Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of  the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of  Korea, 
US-S. Korea, July 9, 1966, 17 UST. 1677 [hereinafter US-South Korea SOFA]. 
29  See Lee, supra note 18, at 221 (elaborating that in 1966, South Korea was still trying to rebuild from the Korean War 
and therefore, did not have much infl uence in negotiating the US-South Korea SOFA).
30  E.g., Steven G. Hemmert, Peace-Keeping Mission SOFAS:  US Interests in Criminal Jurisdiction, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 215, 
226 (1999) (stating that when the US signs a SOFA with another country, it refers to the US-NATO SOFA as the model 
agreement, even though the US usually maintains criminal jurisdiction over its troops that are stationed within the 
borders of  other countries).
31  See John W. Egan, Comment, The Future of  Criminal Jurisdiction Over the Deployed American Soldier:  Four Major Trends 
in Bilateral US Status of  Forces Agreement, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 291, 293 (2006); see also Lee, supra note 18, at 220 
(emphasizing that the US-NATO SOFA remains the only completely reciprocal SOFA with the US as a party).
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critics’ arguments.32
Article XXII of  the US-South Korea SOFA and Article VII of  the US-NATO SOFA, specify 
the applicable criminal jurisdiction procedures.33  The most notable difference between the criminal 
jurisdiction provisions of  the US-South Korea SOFA and the US-NATO SOFA is that under the 
former, the US may claim jurisdiction over the dependents of  USFK personnel, including its military 
and civilian components.34  On the other hand, under the US-NATO SOFA, the US may claim juris-
diction over all members of  the armed forces but not their dependents.35 Therefore, under the US-
South Korea SOFA, a dependent of  the USFK is relatively immune from the criminal jurisdiction 
of  South Korea and is exempted from the jurisdiction of  the USFK solely due to their status as a 
dependent.36  The passage of  the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of  2000 (MEJA) narrowed 
this gap in criminal jurisdiction by making felonious actions of  the dependents abroad a federal 
crime.37  However, the MEJA merely fi lled in the jurisdictional gap that existed in US laws concern-
ing dependents accompanying the Armed Forces and did not resolve the loophole in the US-South 
Korea SOFA.38  Therefore, even with the passing of  the MEJA, US citizens who are classifi ed as a 
dependent of  the USFK remain immune from the criminal jurisdiction of  South Korea, unlike other 
non–USFK–related dependents.39  
However, this discrepancy between the US-South Korea SOFA and the US-NATO SOFA is 
not the focal point of  the controversy. Most anti-American sentiment arises from the actions of  
the military component of  the USFK and not the civilian component or the dependents.40  In most 
32  Compare US-South Korea SOFA, supra note 28, art. XXII, with Agreement, with Appendix, between the United 
States of  America and Other Governments, June 19, 1951, 4 UST. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 [hereinafter US-NATO 
SOFA], art. VII (comparing the respective criminal jurisdiction provisions reveal the striking similarity between the two 
SOFAs).
33  Compare US-South Korea SOFA, supra note 28, art. XXII, with US-NATO SOFA, supra note 32, art. VII.
34  See Lee, supra note 18, at 228 (explaining that under Paragraphs 1(a), 2(a), and 3(a), South Korea has never enjoyed 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the dependents of  the military forces who commit offenses that are punishable under 
its law). 
35  See US-NATO SOFA, supra note 32, art. VII, ¶ 1(a), 2(a), 3(a) (stating that the sending State has primary 
jurisdiction over those subject to its military law).
36  See Lee, supra note 18, at 226 (assessing that the US-South Korea SOFA unfairly protects dependents of  the US 
military because neither the US domestic law nor the Uniform Code of  Military Justice applied to civilians in a foreign 
country although the US reserved the right to exercise primary jurisdiction over them). 
37  See generally Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of  2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, § 3261(a), 114 Stat. 2488 
(codifi ed at 18 USC. § 3261) (allowing persons employed by or accompanying the armed forces overseas to be 
prosecuted for any offense that would have been punishable if  committed within the US).
38  See Fredrick A. Stein, Have We Closed the Barn Door Yet? A Look at the Current Loopholes in the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 579, 597 (2005) (analyzing the defi nition of  persons “accompanying the Armed 
Forces” under the MEJA to include dependents of  members of  the Armed Forces, the Department of  Defense, and 
Department of  Defense contractors).
39  See Lee, supra note 18, at 226 (stating that the MEJA only applied to US criminal law, but did not provide for South 
Korea to prosecute USFK dependents).
40  See Mark R. Ruppert, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Environmental Offenses Committed Overseas:  How to Maximize and When to 
Say “NO”, 40 A.F. L. REV. 1, 10 (1996) (acknowledging that despite the continued good relations among allies most of  
the time, friction between the visiting military personnel and the host nation’s population is inevitable).
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incidents involving a clash between USFK military personnel and South Koreans, both countries 
will have signifi cant interests in the matter and therefore, the heart of  the controversy involves the 
concurrent nature of  the jurisdictions and the resulting procedural tensions.41    
The concurrent jurisdiction provisions are identical under the US-South Korea SOFA and the 
US-NATO SOFA.42  Therefore, the critics’ argument condemning the textual unfairness of  the 
SOFA is unconvincing.43  The true source of  confl ict in the US-South Korea SOFA criminal juris-
diction provision lies in the concept of  offi cial duty and the procedural habits involving the issuance 
of  offi cial duty certifi cates and jurisdictional waiver requests.44  
Paragraph 3(a) of  the respective concurrent criminal jurisdiction articles in the US-South Korea 
SOFA and the US-NATO SOFA states the US shall have primary jurisdiction over:  (i) crimes com-
mitted only against the interests of  the US, and (ii) “offenses arising out of  . . . performance of  of-
fi cial duty.”45   The US-NATO SOFA does not defi ne offi cial duty.46  On the other hand, the Agreed 
Minutes of  the US-South Korea SOFA specifi es that a “substantial departure from the acts a person 
is required to perform in a particular duty will usually indicate an act outside of  the person’s offi cial 
duty.”47  It also notes that a duty certifi cate issued by a competent USFK offi cer is conclusive and 
is suffi cient evidence of  offi cial duty for the purpose of  allocating jurisdiction to the US unless it is 
successfully challenged by the South Korean authorities.48    
In light of  these guidelines, offi cial duty under the US-South Korea SOFA refers not to any act 
a person performs while on duty but something similar to an act a person is required to perform 
during that particular duty.49  It also refers to any action by USFK personnel that has qualifi ed to 
41  See Egan, supra note 31, at 315 (explaining that after years of  requests by the South Korean government, the US 
revised the US-South Korea SOFA to more equitably share the sovereign prerogative of  criminal jurisdiction).
42  Compare US-South Korea SOFA, supra note 28, art. XXII, ¶ 3, with US-NATO SOFA, supra note 32, art. VII, ¶ 3.
43  See Youngjin Jung, Where Does Inequality Come From?  An Analysis of  the Korea-United States Status of  Forces Agreement, 
18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1103, 1143 (2003).
 (pointing out that after two rounds of  revisions, the US-South Korea SOFA is very similar to the US-NATO SOFA and 
has drastically lessened the extent the critics may argue that the agreement is unfair).
44  See Steven J. Lepper, A Primer on Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 37 A.F. L. REV. 169, 174 (1994) (describing important 
criminal jurisdiction exceptions:  (1) crimes committed only against the sending state, (2) the offi cial duty exception, and 
(3) the jurisdictional waiver exception).
45  Compare US-South Korea SOFA, supra note 28, art. XXII, ¶ 3a, with US-NATO SOFA, supra note 32, art. VII, ¶ 3a.
46  See Lepper, supra note 44, at 176 (stating that after multiple rounds of  negotiations, delegates were unable to agree 
on an acceptable defi nition of  offi cial duty and each state is left to rely on its own defi nitions).
47  Agreed Minutes to the Agreement under Article IV of  the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of  
America and the Republic of  Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of  the United States Armed Forces 
in the Republic of  Korea, US-S. Korea, art. XXII, re para. 3(a), July 9, 1966, 17 UST. 1677 [hereinafter US-South Korea 
SOFA Agreed Minutes regarding 3(a)].
48  See id. (advancing that the US authorities  “shall give due consideration” if  South Korean authorities object to the 
conclusiveness of  the duty certifi cate).
49  Cf. Kimberly C. Priest-Hamilton, Comment, Who Really Should Have Exercised Jurisdiction Over the Military Pilots 
Implicated in the 1998 Italy Gondola Accident?, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 605, 624 (2000) (comparing the two most extreme 
defi nitions of  offi cial duty asserted by members of  the US-NATO SOFA: ‘only the acts done within the limits of  an 
offi cial duty’ and ‘any act surrounding the duties of  the US military’).
109NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEFVol. 1, No. 1
receive a duty certifi cate, as long as South Korean authorities do not successfully challenge them.50  
Although the Agreed Minutes only provide what is not considered an offi cial duty, the US-South 
Korea SOFA nonetheless contains more substantive guidance in this matter than the US-NATO 
SOFA.51  However, the guidelines in the Agreed Minutes do not necessarily equate to a more equi-
table SOFA for South Korea.  In practice, the US has issued duty certifi cates almost automatically, 
when it should have been issued only in appropriate circumstances.52  On paper, the South Korean 
government has the right to challenge the duty certifi cate’s validity.53  Nevertheless, once a duty 
certifi cate is issued, South Korean offi cials have customarily accepted it as conclusive and binding 
without questioning its validity or impartiality, thereby waiving the jurisdiction to the US.54  Even 
though the US-NATO SOFA document is silent on the duty certifi cate system, an identical system 
exists in many NATO countries as well.55  
The US-South Korea SOFA and the US-NATO SOFA also contain identical jurisdictional 
waiver request systems.56  According to the SOFAs, jurisdictional waivers should be requested only 
if  the issue is of  particular importance to the sending state and the state with primary jurisdiction 
should grant waivers only after giving it sympathetic consideration.57  Therefore, in theory, the SO-
FAs limit the US from requesting jurisdictional waivers only to cases in which not doing so would 
gravely endanger its interests.58  However, in practice, the US has indiscriminately requested jurisdic-
tional waivers without giving much consideration as to the matter’s particular importance in order to 
maximize jurisdiction without considering on what basis it would prosecute the military personnel.59  
In addition, South Korea has granted jurisdictional waivers almost automatically without sympa-
50  See Ruppert, supra note 40, at 30 (noting that US authorities have generally labeled any act or omission occurring 
“incidental” to the performance of  offi cial duty to be eligible to receive a duty certifi cate).
51  See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 49, at 627 (pointing out that the US-NATO SOFA’s drafting committee failed to 
defi ne offi cial duty and left it open for interpretation by signatory members).
52  See Lepper, supra note 44, at 176 (noting that offi cial duty certifi cates should only be issued in appropriate 
circumstances to preserve its credibility).
53  E.g., US-South Korea SOFA Agreed Minutes regarding 3(a), supra note 47.
54  See Lee, supra note 18, at 240 (describing the tendency of  South Korean authorities to automatically accept duty 
certifi cates).
55  See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 49, at 625–26 (addressing the counterintuitive US-NATO SOFA procedure in 
which the sending state obtains the waiver of  receiving state’s primary jurisdiction through its issuance of  offi cial duty 
certifi cates).
56  Compare US-South Korea SOFA, supra note 28, art. XXII, ¶ 3(c), with US-NATO SOFA, supra note 32, art. VII, ¶ 
3(c). 
57  See Jung, supra note 43, at 1129 (commenting that the jurisdictional waivers should be granted to punish offenders 
under the proper jurisdiction and not to grant immunity).  
58  See Michael Noone, Treaty Implementation:  Lessons Taught by US/UK Cooperation Under the NATO Status of  Forces 
Agreement, 13 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 39, 58–59 (2000) (discussing the Senate resolution concerning the ratifi cation of  the US-
NATO SOFA which authorized jurisdictional waiver requests only if  the accused will not be granted his Constitutional 
rights under the laws of  the receiving state).
59  See Ruppert, supra note 40, at 31 (commenting that waiver requests are often used to maximize jurisdiction without 
considering the underlying reasons for prosecution).
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thetic considerations.60  As a result of  these procedural habits of  automatically issuing and accepting 
offi cial duty certifi cates and jurisdictional waivers, the US has retained jurisdiction over many cases 
which the accused USFK personnel have walked away with just a slap on the wrist.61  Consequently, 
these toothless procedural limits have strengthened the South Korean public’s view that the US-
South Korea SOFA is just a tool allowing USFK personnel to avoid prosecution for the crimes 
they have committed in the peninsula.62  Many locals in NATO countries share the same feelings of  
injustice and inequality as the South Koreans.63  Since it is highly unlikely that the US will relinquish 
jurisdiction over its personnel any further than it has under the US-NATO SOFA, the perceived 
injustice must be resolved by changing the procedural habits of  the US and South Korea.64
B. Environmental provisions under the US-South Korea SOFA and the US-NATO SOFA differ signifi cantly.
The terms and conditions of  returning the facilities back to the host nations differ signifi cantly 
between the US-South Korea SOFA and the US-NATO SOFA, including the supplementary US-
Germany SOFA.65  Paragraph 5(c) of  Article LXIII of  the US-Germany SOFA specifi es that the 
German authorities may negotiate the terms of  compensation and return of  facilities.66  Paragraph 
6(c) states that if  the fi xtures on the facilities do not have practical public use, the US must pay to 
clear the area.67  The US-Germany SOFA also “requires the US to pay for the “assessment, evalua-
60  See Jung, supra note 43, at 1130 (mentioning that South Korea’s rate of  exercising jurisdiction is about three percent 
of  all criminal cases, which means that South Korea has waived its jurisdiction about ninety-seven percent of  the time at 
the request of  the USFK).
61  See id. at 1130–31 (commenting that although the US military authorities suggest that the high jurisdictional waiver 
rates are due to the confi dence other countries have in the US military justice system, critics argue that US court martial 
convictions in a foreign country are very lenient and cannot deter criminal offenses by US service members).
62  See id. at 1131 (asserting that serious crimes committed by US service members have often stirred up public 
protests in South Korea because authorities of  the US and South Korea will most likely fail to respond satisfactorily to 
such crimes). 
63  See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 49, at 607 (describing a controversial incident in 1998 in which the US retained 
jurisdiction based on an offi cial duty argument, after a US military jet fl ew into ski gondola cables in Italy, killing twenty 
passengers).   
64  See Mark E. Eichelman, International Criminal Jurisdiction Issues for the United States Military, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2000 23, 
at 28–29 (2000) (noting that the Philippines attempted to solidify more favorable terms than those given to European 
countries under the US-NATO SOFA but failed as the US refused to sign a new SOFA before the expiration of  the old 
agreement).
65  Compare US-South Korea SOFA, supra note 28, art. IV, with Agreement to Supplement the Agreement Between 
the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of  their Forces with respect to Foreign Forces stationed in 
the Federal Republic of  Germany, U.S.-F.R.G., Aug. 3, 1959, 14 UST. 531, art. LXIII [hereinafter US-Germany SOFA] 
(advancing two different sets of  environmental obligations under the two SOFAs).
66  US-Germany SOFA, supra note 65, art. LXIII, ¶. 5(c). 
67  Id. at art. LXIII, para. 6(c). 
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tion, and remedying of  hazardous substance contamination caused” by it.68
Conversely, under paragraph 1 of  Article IV of  the US-South Korea SOFA, the US may re-
turn the facilities without compensating the South Korean government for the cost of  restoring 
and cleaning up the facilities.69  The second paragraph states that the South Korean government “is 
not obliged to [pay] . . . for any improvements made in facilities” regardless of  whether it has any 
practical civilian uses.70  The Agreed Minutes state that the US will “respect relevant [South Korean] 
environmental laws” and “promptly undertake to remedy contamination caused by [USFK] . . . that 
poses a known, imminent and substantial endangerment to human health.”71  
Through careful choice of  words, the US avoids environmental obligations under the US-South 
Korea SOFA.72  Even if  an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health is proven, the 
US is obliged only to remedy the contamination that is proven to be caused by the US military activ-
ity and only respect, not enforce, South Korean environmental laws.73  Unlike the words “will” or 
“shall”, the word “respect” is not legally binding and the requirement of  an “imminent and substan-
tial” endangerment sets a very high bar of  required proof.74  Maintaining its position, the US argues 
that the improved value of  the returned facilities will offset the costs of  the cleanup because the 
South Korean government is not obliged to compensate the US for the value of  the property being 
returned.75  
This “offset” approach assumes the improved value will exceed the cost of  cleanup and the im-
provements made to the facilities will have practical civilian uses.76  In reality, redeveloping the mili-
tary bases for civilian purposes require removal of  military facilities and will only add to the costs 
68  Yusun Woo, Note, Environmental Problems on the US Military Bases in the Republic of  Korea: Who is Responsible for the 
Cleanup Expenses and Whose Environmental Standards Will Apply?, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 577, 601 (2007) (pointing 
out the part of  the US-Germany SOFA that is commonly cited by South Korean critics to prove the unfairness of  the 
US-South Korea SOFA).
69  US-South Korea SOFA, supra note 28, art. IV, ¶ 1 (exempting the US from restoring the facilities to its original 
condition and from compensating South Korea).
70  Id. at art. IV, ¶ 2. 
71  Amendments to the Agreed Minutes of  July 9, 1966 to the Agreement under Article IV of  the Mutual Defense 
Treaty Between the United States of  America and the Republic of  Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status 
of  the United States Armed Forces in the Republic of  Korea, U.S.-S. Korea, re art. III, ¶ 2, July 9, 1966, 17 UST. 1677 
[hereinafter US-South Korea SOFA Agreed Minutes regarding Article III 2]. 
72  See Tania Marie Proechel, Solving International Environmental Crimes: The International Environmental Military Base 
Reconstruction Act—a Problem, a Proposal, and a Solution, 29 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 124 (2007) (explaining that 
the “imminent and substantial danger to human life” standards has been commonly used in other SOFAs and treaties to 
limit obligations by focusing on immediately obvious dangers and ignoring latent, long-term harms).
73  US-South Korea SOFA Agreed Minutes regarding Article III 2, supra note 71. 
74  Woo, supra note 68, at 605–06
75  See id. at 600–02 (analyzing the rationale that normally, when the US closes an overseas military base, the host 
country is required to compensate the US for the current value of  the property).
76  See id. at 601.
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for South Korea.77  Accordingly, the offset approach is a fl awed argument that ignores the reality of  
the cleanup process.  Instead, the calculation of  the residual value of  the returned property should 
be based on the future usefulness for the host country and the US-South Korea SOFA should be 
revised to refl ect equitable sharing of  costs between the two countries.78    
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of  the threat posed by the nuclear brinkmanship of  North Korea and the increasing 
importance of  South Korea to the economic and political interests of  the US, the need to maintain 
a healthy US-South Korea alliance is as important as any point in the past.  For example, in order for 
a policy against North Korea to be successful, it would certainly require at least an implicit coopera-
tion by South Korea.79  Regardless of  the positions of  the offi cial channels of  diplomacy between 
the two nations, the true source of  a healthy alliance is derived from the support of  the general 
population.  Therefore, in order for the US to maintain its geopolitical infl uence and to protect its 
interests in the peninsula, it is crucial to reduce the possible sources of  anti-American sentiment in 
South Korea when it is possible to do so.80  Notwithstanding the planned transfer of  wartime op-
erational control from the US to South Korea in 2012 and the relocation of  the Yongsan Garrison 
to a base outside of  Seoul by 2014, the USFK will continue to maintain around 29,000 troops in the 
peninsula.81  Therefore, regardless of  decreased military presence and infl uence exerted by the US, 
signifi cant number of  USFK personnel will continue to interact with local South Koreans.  Such re-
design of  the military element of  the US-South Korea alliance must remain sensitive to the sources 
of  anti-American sentiments that could potentially undermine the strength of  the alliance.82
The revised approach must benefi t both countries while being practical and not purely theoreti-
77  See generally Severe Pollution Levels Detected at 13 US Bases Scheduled For Return to S. Korea, supra note 23 (discussing the 
bases that were returned to South Korea in 2007 and how the initial estimated cleanup cost has tripled as the full extent 
of  the environmental damage has been revealed over time).
78  See Woo, supra note 68, at 602; see generally 79.1% of  Koreans Believe That the US Should Clean Up Pollution Within US 
Military Bases, GREEN KOREAN UNITED, Feb. 13, 2006, available at http://green-korea.tistory.com/49 (listing the answers 
to the following questions posed to South Koreans:  “‘Who should be responsible for the cost of  cleaning up pollution 
within US military bases:  the US 79.1%, Korea 4.0%, both countries 10.8%”’ and “‘Possible solutions to US military 
base pollution:  amending the US-South Korea SOFA 59.6%, demanding US to take responsibility 25.1%, making 
pollution assessments transparent to the public 10.7%”’).  
79  See Mark E. Manyin , SOUTH KOREAN POLITICS AND RISING “ANTI-AMERICANISM”:  IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
TOWARD NORTH KOREA, South Korean Politics and Rising “Anti-Americanism”: Implications for U.S. Policy Toward North 
Korea, REPORT FOR CONGRESS 11 (Congressional Research Service 2003), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/27530.pdf.  
80  See Lee, supra note 18, at 249 (noting that neither the US nor South Korea benefi ts from anti-American sentiments 
and both countries recognize the importance of  maintaining US troops in the peninsula).  
81  See Sung-Ki Jung, USFK Seeks to Expand Role Outside Peninsula, THE KOREA TIMES, Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/02/ 205_61388.html; Sung-Ki Jung, Yongsan Garrison to be Relocated 
by 2014, THE KOREA TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/01/ 
113_37344.html.  
82  See Victor Cha, U.S.-Korea Relations: Obama’s Korea Inheritance, COMP. CONNECTIONS:  A Q. E-JOURNAL ON E. ASIAN 
BILATERAL REL., Jan. 2009, available at http://csis.org/fi les/media/csis/pubs/0804qus_korea.pdf. 
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cal in nature.83  The anti-American sentiment arising from the crimes perpetrated by  USFK person-
nel against local South Koreans are mostly attributable to the implementation of  the criminal juris-
diction provisions rather than the document itself.  A pattern of  automatic jurisdiction transfers and 
the lack of  punishments have created a sense that USFK soldiers can “get away with murder” under 
the veil of  the SOFA.84  
First, the US should adopt the following provision to request waivers of  exclusive jurisdiction 
as well as primary jurisdiction “[i]t is understood that the United States authorities shall exercise 
utmost restraint in requesting waivers of  . . . jurisdiction.”85  Limiting jurisdictional transfers to truly 
meritorious cases will improve the legitimacy of  the procedure.  It will also deter USFK person-
nel from committing crimes in South Korea to avoid the likelihood of  being prosecuted by South 
Korean courts rather than by the seemingly more lenient US court martial.86  Additionally, it will help 
to convince the South Korean public that the criminal jurisdiction process of  the US-South Korea 
SOFA is as fair and reasonable as it would have been under the applicable South Korean laws.87  On 
a similar note, “offi cial duty” should be defi ned more concretely to create a more stable guideline 
rather than a case-by-case analysis that naturally arises out of  the Agreed Minutes regarding 3(a) and 
the US should issue duty certifi cates only in truly meritorious cases.88  Duty certifi cates must not be-
come an abusive tool to maintain jurisdiction in every case of  concurrent jurisdiction.89  A concrete 
defi nition will boost the credibility of  duty certifi cates and the process of  jurisdictional negotiations 
will be more effi cient and less suspicious.90  
Second, granting immunity to the dependents of  the USFK should be removed to mirror the 
US-NATO SOFA.  Even with the MEJA, US citizens who are classifi ed as the dependents remain 
relatively immune from the criminal jurisdiction of  South Korea compared to other non-USFK-
related civilians.  Especially in light of  the approval by the Department of  Defense to allow mili-
tary USFK personnel to live with their family members in South Korea, this gap in South Korean 
jurisdiction should be removed.91  By removing the protection of  dependents, the US-South Korea 
83  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 18, at 242 (explaining that any revision of  the US-South Korea SOFA must be practical 
enough to be implemented by both parties).
84  See Jung, supra note 43, at 1143 (commenting on the perception among South Koreans that US soldiers are not 
properly punished for their crimes).
85  See US-South Korea SOFA Agreed Minutes regarding Article III 2, supra note 71. 
86  See Lepper, supra note 44, at 179 (arguing that maximizing jurisdiction does not mean that the US must secure a 
jurisdictional waiver in every instances); see also Jung, supra note 43, at 1131 (explaining the criticism that when a soldier is 
tried under US jurisdiction as a result of  waivers, the resulting punishments tend to be “a slap on the wrist”).
87  See Lee, supra note 18, at 247 (claiming that SOFA will endure only so long as the two nations maintain a good 
relationship through a uniform approach that will ensure that all parties are treated equally in all situations).
88  See US-South Korea SOFA Agreed Minutes regarding 3(a), supra note 47; see also Lepper, supra note 44, at 176 
(warning that absent a set defi nition of  offi cial duty, the tendency to maximize jurisdiction will deteriorate future 
credibility of  duty certifi cates).
89  See Lepper, supra note 44, at 176 (describing the possibility that an expansive defi nition of  offi cial duty will in effect 
implement the Law of  the Flag doctrine).
90  See Priest-Hamilton, supra note 49, at 634–35 (discussing the dispute between Italy and the US in determining 
offi cial duty and describing how the US is perceived as a bully that will ultimately get its way).
91  See USFK Seeks to Expand Role Outside Peninsula, supra note 81.
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SOFA will mirror the US-NATO SOFA and will reduce another unnecessary source of  anti-Ameri-
can sentiments.92  The removal will not necessarily be unfair to the US but will only lower the grant-
ed level of  protection of  the dependents to the level that is granted by the most equitable SOFA 
that the US is a party:  the US-NATO SOFA.93  
Finally, Article IV of  the US-South Korea SOFA should be revised to resemble Article LXIII 
of  the US-NATO SOFA.  In order to account for the absence of  South Korean troops and bases in 
the US, the US should not be fully accountable for the environmental damages caused by the pres-
ence of  USFK.94  Instead, the two governments should calculate the difference between the cost of  
the cleanup and the value of  the improvements made by the USFK that has potential civilian uses.  
If  the cost of  the cleanup is not offset by the value of  the improvements, the remainder should be 
divided into portions to be paid by both governments.95  If  the value of  the improvements exceeds 
the cost of  the cleanup, the South Korean government should pay the US a reasonable amount for 
compensation.96  Regardless of  how the cost will be shared, the most important point is that the US 
should be somewhat responsible for the pollution caused by its past actions.97    
V.  CONCLUSION 
South Korea remains as a valuable ally for the US in maintaining its geopolitical infl uence in 
East Asia.98  Whether the issue is about supporting the US’s policy towards North Korea or import-
ing American products into the South Korean market, the determining factor behind South Korea’s 
position is the support of  the general public.  It is more than likely that the US-South Korea alliance 
will continue to exist for some time to come.  However, the strength of  the alliance will depend 
signifi cantly on the support of  the general public.  Adopting the recommendations listed in this ar-
ticle will promote discipline among USFK military personnel and will help to match the US’s rheto-
92  See Gannon, supra note 27, at 263–64 (characterizing South Koreans’ resentment over the SOFA criminal 
jurisdiction provision).
93  See Lee, supra note 18, at 220 (commenting that although the US-South Korea SOFA was modeled after the US-
NATO SOFA, the latter remains as “the only completely reciprocal SOFA” signed by the US).
94  See Woo, supra note 68, at 601–02 (explaining the US’s position that the reason for the reciprocal nature of  the US-
Germany SOFA is because Germany has a reciprocal obligation to compensate the US for the facilities within the US 
bases).
95  See Woo, supra note 68, at 597 (explaining that since host nations receive economic, political, and national security 
benefi ts from the presence of  the US military, the host nation and the US should be jointly responsible for the 
environmental pollution).
96  See id. at 601 (commenting on the US’s argument that South Korea benefi ts by not paying off  the difference 
between the residual value of  the bases and “the environmental remediation expenses instead is ‘allowed’ to give up its 
remediation claims”).
97  See id. at 612 (arguing that the US should admit its responsibility for the portion of  the cleanup expenses and 
negotiate with South Korea to allocate the responsibility for the expenses in good faith while considering the economic 
and the social security provided by the presence of  USFK).
98  See Snyder, supra note 13, at 1 (explaining that the US-South Korea alliance continues to be an instrument through 
which the US demonstrates its commitment for stability and balance of  power in East Asia, especially in light of  the 
threat posed by North Korea).
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ric concerning environmental accountability with its offi cial policies, while also easing the tension 
between the USFK and local South Koreans.99  Therefore, the US and South Korea should seriously 
consider changing their procedural habits, defi ning crucial terms, and revising certain provisions in 
the US-South Korea SOFA in order to reduce the possible sources of  anti-American sentiment aris-
ing out of  the presence of  USFK, thereby preventing a systematic deterioration of  the alliance.
99  See Ruppert, supra note 40, at 47 (criticizing the US for failing to match the rhetoric concerning environmental 
compliance in its military bases overseas).
